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ABSTRACT 





The government is cutting down government impediments and entering into the market. 
One of the outcomes has been the rise of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). There have 
been a lot of information and transaction cost problems in government institutions. These 
issues can be sorted and mitigated if the risk is shared with the private sector. 
Until 1990, there had been a monopoly of the public sector developing transit 
projects. Now with the PPP concept, the transit projects are slowly moving into public 
private partnership agreements. This study tries to identify the various approaches of 
public private partnership delivery system. A few successful case studies are studied and 
analyzed to figure out which delivery system works well with smaller and bigger 
projects. 
Issues are identified in this study by comparing some of the delivery approaches. 
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1.1 Concept: Public-Private Partnerships 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are essentially a form of procurement where a single 
private entity, typically a consortium of private companies is responsible and financially 
liable for performing all or specific responsibilities of a project within a specified time 
period. Contrasting to the earlier practicesm that all the responsibilities of a project were 
separated and contracted separately, a PPP agreement aggregates two or more 
responsibilities like design,  construction, and/or operation all together, and awards to a 
single contractor. The whole PPP system also might attract private capital through 
innovative approaches.  
The public and private sectors are supposed to work hand in hand to help share 
information and resources which makes the project finished on time or earlier. Until 1990 
there was a public monopoly for infrastructure projects, which has changed after the 
introduction of the public private partnership concept in the infrastructure development. 
The management of roads, bridges, and tunnels by the private sector started before they 
are allowed into managing public transit projects, such as Light Rail Transit (LRT) and 
Commuter Rails. Later the private sector also started developing transit corridors which 
in a way promoted real estate development in and around transit facilities. These real 
estate developments are known as “joint development” or “transit oriented development.” 
These kinds of projects require a lot of capital and innovative approaches can be used to 
attract private companies to finance such projects partially. 
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Innovative approaches can bring in additional capital. Operating revenues can be 
earned through the receipt of lease payments, access fees, and increased fare revenues. 
Bringing additional capital from the market helps in sharing of resources and also shares 
risks and rewards.  The degree of resources shared or risk and rewards shared varies from 
project to project.  
There are various kinds of public-private partnerships in transit projects. They can 
be of either lesser or greater private role.  
Lesser Private Sector Role 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)  
Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) A   
Design-Build (DB) 




1.1.1 Lesser Private Sector Role 
Design-Build-Operate-Maintain and Build-Operate-Transfer: Under a design-build-
operate-maintain (“DBOM”) or build-operate-transfer (“BOT”) delivery transfer 
approach, the selected contractor or the private agency is responsible for the design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the project for a specified time period. The 
private agency has to go on a contract where the performance standards will be 
mentioned. They need to follow the project quality standards and design specifications 
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mentioned in the contract. Since the private agency is responsible for operation, and 
maintenance of the project, the project turns out to be of good quality.   
Since 2000, three transit projects in the U.S. have been procured as DBOMs: NJ 
Transit Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 and MOS-2 and JFK Air train. 
Design-Build: In the design-build (“DB”) delivery approach, the private agency or the 
contractor is responsible for the design and construction phase of the project. It is a fixed-
fee contract. The private entity can be one private company or a consortium of private 
companies who are responsible for all the design and construction errors and 
specifications. If there is more than one contractor under one contract then they need to 
work together for better on-time performance. Bidding is done generally to select the 
contractors for this approach. The DB approach is mostly considered for the transit 
projects in the United States and the projects which considered DB approach have been 
successful overall.  
Since 2000, many transit projects have been procured using a DB  approach, 
including:  
• Denver RTD Southeast Corridor LRT;  
• South Florida Commuter Rail Upgrades;  
• Minneapolis Hiawatha LRT;  
• WMATA Largo Metrorail Extension; and  
In addition there are two non-New Start fixed guide way projects with Federal interest 
that have been delivered using a DB approach: Portland MAX Airport Extension and JFK 




1.1.2  Greater Private Sector Role 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO): Under a build-own-operate approach, the private company 
is responsible for the maintenance of the contractor. Unlike other approaches, in a BOO 
approach, the private partner owns the project and is responsible for all operating revenue 
risk and any surplus revenues for the life of the project. They can innovate new strategies 
to improve the quality of the project overall. 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate and Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain: The 
design-build-finance-operate (“DBFO”) and Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintenance 
(“DBFOM”) delivery approaches are a variation of the Design-Build-Operate-
Maintenance (“DBOM”) approach which has been mentioned earlier in this project. In 
addition to the design, construction, and operation of the project, the private entity is also 
responsible for all or half of the project’s financing. DBFO and DBFOM approaches are 
very similar to DBOM approach. The only addition is that it includes the transfer of the 
financial risks to the private entity during the contract period. Though the private sector 
finances partially, but the ownership rights of the project remain in the public sector. The 
private sector’s debt is repaid by all or a portion of the revenue. Revenue is generally 
generated by the public sector through taxes or user fees. This revenue in turn repays all 
the debt of the private sector.  One of the most successful projects with DBFO approach 







1.2 Need For The Study 
The U. S. government has shifted from its monopoly of developing transit projects by the 
public sector to joint efforts by the private and public partners (PPP). One of the 
outcomes has been the rise of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for public transit 
projects, which mitigated risk and share costs and benefits among all stakeholders.. 
This study tries to identify and evaluate various PPP approaches in delivering 
public transit projects via a number of case studies. A few case studies of the U. S. are 
examined and analyzed to identify which PPP approach worked well with various small 
and large projects with various legislation, financial, and institutional arrangements. 
Various PPP approaches, such as Build-Operate-Transfer, Design-Build-Operate-
Maintain (DBOM), or Design-Build (DB) have been implemented in the transit 
development processes. The study highlights the unique characteristics of each based on 
the magnitudes of private sector involvement, effects of risk mitigation, and results of 
cost and time reduction for the overall project. Recommendations are made in regards to 
the most applicable PPP approaches and their corresponding circumstances. Further 












To identify the project delivery approaches of public private partnership in transit 




• To understand the concept of public private partnership and its various forms. 
• To review case studies to analyze the impact of public private partnership on the 
projects. 
• To analyze innovations that impacted the projects. 







Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects can take a number of different forms. A 
literature review of these various forms is required to properly understand what kind of 
variations can be possible be it a long-term or short term contract. 
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has listed a number of variations 
of the Design-Build (DB) contract, such as: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT); Design-
Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM); Design- Construct-Maintain (DCM); Design-Build-
Finance-Operate  (DBFO); Build-Own-Operate (BOO); Performance Specified 
Maintenance Contracts (PSMC) and Concessions. 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT); Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM); Design- 
Construct-Maintain (DCM): In these approaches, the public sector sponsors the project 
The private sector receives revenues from the public sector through taxes and user fees. 
The private contractor is responsible for the design and construction, operations and 
maintenance of the project.  
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): In this variation,  the  private  sector  is not 
only responsible for  design, construction and operation the project but also they finance 
the project partially or fully. The private sector earns revenue by the user fees or from the 
public sector in the form of tolls. Though the private sector funds a part of the project, the 
ownership still remains with the public agency. 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO): This approach is not that popular with the transportation 
projects. In this case, the private sector develops, finances, designs, builds, owns, 
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operates, and maintains the project. Transit projects are public property and hence they 
cannot be owned by the private agency. Hence this approach is not that popular with the 
transit projects. The contractor is responsible for all the operating revenue risk, but 
retains all the surplus revenues. 
Performance Specified Maintenance Contracts (PSMC): This type of contract 
pertains to the rehabilitation and maintenance of highways for a specified period. 
Concessions: This variation on DB contracts allows the concessionaire to design, build, 
and operate a project with the right to receive revenues from operations and/or receive 
payments from the public agency. The debt of the contractor is anyway repaid by the 
revenue generated from operations through user fees. This contract variation has many of 
the characteristics of the DBOM contracts and typically the average contract period is 
between 15 and 30years. The use of concessions is very prevalent in some European 
countries, such as Portugal and France.  
Teigen (2007) listed the following benefits resulting from PPPs: 
• It is a mechanism that provides infrastructure on time and allows the public sector to 
spread the cost of the infrastructure over the life of the asset. 
• Most PPP infrastructure projects  are  completed  on-time  or  earlier. This is because 
the private sector needs the revenue to repay the capital costs which they have invested. 
Though this is applicable to only a few variations. 
• The maintenance of the infrastructure is transferred to the private sector in some of the 
PPP approaches. This ensures that assets are adequately maintained. This also provides 
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an incentive to the private sector for long term quality standards as it will be responsible 
for operation and maintenance expenses over a long term period. 
• The private sector is more customer-oriented because they rely on user fees for their 
revenue streams. 
Teigen (2007) identified three stages in PPP model maturity measured in terms of 
the sophistication of the model adopted and the level of activity in the country (see Figure 
2. 1).  
Countries in Stage One of PPP Model Maturity have: 
• developed dedicated units in agencies to deal with PPP projects, 
• an established policy and legislative framework for PPPs, 
• started to develop a central PPP policy unit to guide the implementation of PPP 
projects, 
• developed deal structures, 
• developed a public sector model to compare the PPP model to, 
• begun to develop the market for PPP and attract private investors, and 
• started to apply early lessons from the transportation sector to other sectors. 
Countries in Stage Two of PPP Model Maturity, such as Portugal, New Zealand, 
Canada, France, and Italy, typically have :  
• developed dedicated units in agencies to deal with PPP projects,  
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• begun to develop hybrid models for the development of PPPs, 
• started to expand the market for PPP projects, 
• leveraged new sources of funding from capital markets, 
• used PPPs to initiate innovation in service delivery, and 
• multiple PPP projects in various sectors of the economy. 
Countries in Stage Three of PPP Model Maturity (e.g., Australia and the UK) have: 
• adopted new innovative PPP models, 
• applied creative and flexible approaches to the roles of the private and public sector in 
the delivery of PPP projects, 
• adopted more sophisticated risk models, 
• emphasized the total lifecycle of a PPP project, 
• a sophisticated infrastructure market with access to pension and private equity funds, 
• leveraged underutilized assets into financial assets, and 
• developed the organizational and skill sets required in government to implement and 










Figure 2.1 Public Private Partnership Maturity Model 
The U.S. is considered to be in stage two of PPP model maturity, mainly because 
of the level of sophistication of the PPP agreements that are being entered into. 
The literature study intends that there are various approaches that are not being 
used or cannot be used for transit projects specifically like Build-Own-Operate. Also, the 
maturity model shows, to reach the highest level of sophistication, a lot of creative and 
flexible approaches are required not only in the private sector but also in the public sector 











There have been a few transit projects throughout the United States that implemented 
PPP approaches. Out of which top five projects have been examined in this study. 
 
3.1 The Transportation Expansion Project (T-REX) 
It was the largest and the most successful transportation upgrade projects in Colorado, 













 Figure 3-1 T-Rex Project Map  
 
Source: T-Rex Transportation Expansion Project Metro Denver/Colorado, 
Project Fact Book, 1999-2006 . 
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 According to the information mentioned in the Metro Denver Organization 
website, the T-REX project finished 3.2% under its $1.67B budget and 22 months ahead 
of schedule in 2006. It is an example of intergovernmental agency cooperation for 
transportation projects in North America and Worldwide. The T-REX corridor carries 
more than 280,000 vehicles per day and connects the two largest employment centers in 
the region: Downtown Denver and the Denver Tech Center. 
3.1.1 Funding 
According to the information gathered from department of transportation website of the 
Federal Highway Administration of Colorado, no new state, county, city, or gas taxes 
were used to fund the T-REX project. This was partially due to the Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights (TABOR) laws enacted in 1992, and the State Leadership's stance against levying 
additional taxes on its constituents. Instead, metropolitan areas that would potentially 
benefit from the expansion voted to approve an increase in property taxes which was 
required for the build out. In November 1999, voters in the affected municipalities 
approved two property-tax increases which later funded the transit portion of the project 
partially. 
The total cost of the project was $1.67 billion. The design-build contract with the 
Southeast Corridor Constructors was worth $1.18 billion. The light rail component cost 
was about $879 million. The highway component cost $795 million and was funded with 
a combination of Highway Users Tax Fund dollars, Senate Bill 97-01 money and 
bonding/federal revenues. 
Lots of real estate development was occurring along the corridor which coincided 




major employment centers in the Denver metro area: the downtown Denver Central 
Business District, and the Southeast Business District. According to the Denver Regional 
Council of Governments (DRCOG), more than 180,000 people work in these two 
employment centers, and another 30,000 or so work along the corridor, include 
businesses along Colorado Boulevard, Evans Avenue, and University Boulevard. 
Forecasters expect downtown and the Denver Tech Center.  
3.1.2 Timeline 
According to the T-Rex Transportation Expansion Project Metro Denver/Colorado, 
Project Fact Book, 1999-2006, a timeline of milestones related to the T-REX project is 
shown below : 
Summer 1995: Major Investment Study (MIS) started by the Colorado Department of 
Transportation (CDOT) 
Fall 1997: Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) adopted Major 
Investment Study (MIS) recommendations which resulted in the adoption of light rail in 
the Denver Regional Council of Government’s fiscally constrained regional 
transportation plan (RTP).  
November 1999: Voters approved two separate ballot initiatives that allowed for the 
issuance of bonds that funded T-REX.  
December 1999: Final environmental impact statement (EIS) completed and design-
build rules established by CDOT 
July 2000: Project announced Shortlist of Proposers 
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March 2000: Record of Decision signed by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 
and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) making T-REX eligible for federal 
funding.  
November 2000: Full Funding Grant Agreement approved by FTA was signed. 
Fall 1999 - May 2001: Design-build contractor procurement process started with the 
development of a Request for Proposals (RFP) and ended with the selection of Southeast 
Corridor Constructors (SECC), a joint venture between Kiewit Construction and Parsons 
Transportation Group, to design and build the $1.67 billion project.  
June 2001- December 2003: Final design phase  
June 2001 – September 2006: Construction of T-REX.  
September 2006: Completion of all highway related construction for the corridor. 
November 2006: Opening of the light rail portion of the corridor. 
3.1.3 Project Concept 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Planning Phase 
A significant effort was made by the project team (RTD, CDOT, and the EIS consultant 
team) and the specific stakeholders and developed during the project planning phase. 
They conducted many workshops between the project team and property owners around 
some of the stations to discuss about development. Minimal changes were made to the 
EIS after receiving developer input. Participants in the workshop, listed many scopes for 
improvement in this phase of the project. One of the most striking points was the need to 
maximize environmental clearance in the EIS phase to preserve future flexibility. RTD 
and CDOT felt locked down the design prior to the release of the RFP for the design-
build contractor. Despite the outreach made during the EIS process, participants felt the 
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need for more participation by the development community and adjacent property 
owners. The problem was RTD and CDOT could not force the stakeholders to the table 
but the local jurisdictions could have, to encourage more early collaboration. If the local 
jurisdictions had prepared and used land-use plans for the station areas, those would have 
been useful in the EIS. Absence of required plans and the lack of initiation of a public 
planning process by the local jurisdiction, the project team made the error of developing 
Transit Oriented Development (TOD) concepts without coordinating well with all the 
local landowners.  
Contractor Solicitation and Request for Proposals (RFP) Phase 
One of the criteria of RFP evaluation was to understand TOD. RTD had limited part-time 
TOD staff which resulted in a limited specific language included in the RFP related to 
TOD. There was a limited TOD experience regionally in Denver which failed to draw a 
specific direction for how to address TOD in the RFP.  
About the Design-Build approach, one respondent from the workshops conducted 
pointed out, “Design-build can work, but the degree of complexity with specific sites 
may warrant extracting them from the design-build contract and handled separately” 
(September 2007, T-REX Transit Oriented Development Lessons Learned Report, 
Regional Transportation District). The feasibility of this option depends on whether the 
federal government funds acquisition or not and the timing of any joint development so 
that revenue can be generated from parking. If the recommendation of the respondent is 
considered, it will bring problems because construction costs may become higher in this 
situation because individual stations would have to bid out separately from the design-
build contract.  
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Final Design Phase 
The project team clearly stated the expectations for responsibility for design changes, 
which rested with the local jurisdiction and/or the developer. Considering the cost 
implications, participants also mentioned the project team and SECC demonstrated 
flexibility in making changes to improve TOD at various sites. Local jurisdictions 
became much more active during this phase of the project. The plan for Village Center at 
Arapahoe Station was a good example of this newfound motivation. Participants felt a 
critical improvement at this phase would be good with extensive community involvement 
mainly where TOD was being considered. On the other hand, participants felt that 
decision-making power was unclear at this phase. Agreements made between the 
developer and contractors were not always acceptable to local jurisdictions.  
To address this issue, clear and frequent communication amongst stakeholders 
was required and also communication of the decision making authority and roles in the 
TOD process was necessary while involving the public when appropriate. One more 
problem this phase of the project suffered was the absence of a full-time TOD expert on 
RTD’s project staff.  
Construction Phase 
There was generally good coordination between the project team and SECC during the 
construction phase. There was a timely resolution of challenges which prevented 
unresolved problems from dragging on. But participants identified a need for more 
transparency in the change order process. They suggested that details of change orders 
should be such that there is a common understanding of how costs were developed which 
will make it easier to reconcile discrepancies in change order costs. They also felt that 
17 
 
local jurisdictions and RTD need to consider the land-use impact on the project. T-REX 
staff felt they were uncomfortable in being caught in the middle of negotiations between 
the developer and local jurisdictions. They recommended using checklists for property 
owners for regulations, easements, etc.  
Information Sharing 
The co-location of the project owners and the design-build contractor helped in sharing 
information. Participants said the minutes of the technical meetings were very useful. 
They also appreciated the quality of public presentations. Participants mentioned there 
was good coordination between land-use planning in station areas of the City and County 
of Denver and preparation of the EIS. They also complemented the project team for being 
transparent. The key opportunity identified for this related to planning. Participants said 
the local jurisdictions must take responsibility for land-use planning and RTD must be 
willing to advise local jurisdictions about the interface with the project process. Stations 
located at jurisdictional borders, such as Dayton, were identified as a special problem. 
These situations required an improved level of coordination.  
Entity Roles 
T-REX experience provided an excellent foundation for the Fast Track program. It was 
critical for all stakeholders to develop a team mentality to address various challenges and 
opportunities. The need for designated TOD representatives for each entity with the 
authority / budget was identified as a necessary improvement that should be made to the 
process. Participants stated that the RFP should be specific in defining roles for the 
contractor and project owner in TOD implementation. The local jurisdictions should have 
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a stronger planning role, and be more supportive of development. Local elected officials 
should be made aware of this issue.  
The T-REX project has been a very successful project. It was completed ahead of 
schedule and within budget with relatively minimal disruption to the neighborhoods 
within the corridor. Considering TOD standpoint, T-REX had some success, but many 
important lessons have been learnt that can be applied to other future Fast Tracks 
corridors to build and improve upon the TOD process. 
 
3.2 The Portland Max Airport Extension  
The Portland MAX Red Line Airport Extension is a 5.5-mile extension of the regional 
light rail system from the Gateway Transit Center to Portland International Airport in 
Portland, Oregon. The route crosses a mixed-use development which is the Portland 
International Center. It is located between I-205 and the airport and runs beside the main 
airport access road to the airport passenger terminal. The extension project includes three 
other stations between the Gateway Transit Center and PDX, two of which serve a 120-
acre development, Cascade Station. The Portland MAX Airport Extension project was 
developed as a public-private partnership with an innovative approach between a joint 
venture of Bechtel Enterprises and Trammell Crow Company, the City of Portland, acting 
through the Portland Development Commission, Tri-Met, and the Port of Portland. 
Metropolitan Area Express opened the first segment of  the MAX light rail system in 
1986 with one 15-mile line between downtown Portland and Gresham in the east of the 
metropolitan area and two years later opened the 18-mile west side extension from 
downtown Portland to the cities of Beaverton and Hillsboro. In 1997 Bechtel Enterprises 
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(Bechtel) approached the Port of Portland and Tri Met for a public-private partnership 
with a proposal to construct a 5.5-mile extension of the MAX system. There was an 
innovative approach to the PPP agreement. It provided Bechtel Enterprises with 
development rights to the land adjacent to the airport in return for covering some of the 
construction costs of the light rail extension. By this, the public costs which were 
involved in developing the airport link were reduced by about 23 percent. The project 
was completed many years earlier than had been planned.  This extension was thought of 
and was included in the transportation plans in its first segment but it was not expected 
that funding will be available until 2010.  
Bechtel proposed for a a Design Build public private partnership approach but 
was providing private sector funding forthe quarterr of the project’s cost in return for a 
contract to design and also to build the extension and development rights of the project. 
The contract was to build the extension and development rights of a 120-acre site which 
is located near the airport on the MAX airport extension. After getting the development 
rights, Bechtel also got the approval to construct a mixed-use development.  The project’s 
primary goal was to create a major employment center on the east side of the city because 







     Source: Tri-Met, “Airport MAX”, January 2000. 
Figure 3.2 Airpor oute and Cascade 
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3.2.1 Funding  
The city of Portland, TriMet, Port of Portland and Bechtel funded the project with 18.9%, 
35.7%, 22.4% and 23.1% respectively. 
The total development costs for the Red Line Airport extension was $128.8 
million which includes engineering and construction costs. There has been confusion 
whether there was a slight increase in the total costs towards the end of the project. 
The Red Line Airport extension was funded partially by local funds and partially 
by Bechtel Enterprises, as shown in Table 3.1. No direct funds from the federal 
government were used in the project, which simplified approval process and allowed 
rapid decision-making. 
Table 3.1 Funding Sources 
Source: PB Consult, Airport Max: A Case Study, April 2009. 
The City of Portland contributed $23.8 million for the construction of the 2.9-mile 
segment from the Gateway Transit Center along the I-205 right-of-way. The City used 
tax increment financing for construction of the segment which was within the Airport 
Way Urban Renewal Area. It issued bonds to generate the funds. Tax revenues were 
incurred from increased land values of parcels within the URA. The revenues were used 
to pay the interest on the bonds and clear the debt. TriMet contributed $45.5 million of 
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the construction costs. Tri Met was also responsible for the development of the 2.9-mile 
segment of the rail corridor. 
The Port of Portland contributed $28.8 million which is 22.4% of the total project 
cost from the airport PFC revenue. The financial relationship between these local funding 
bodies was complex.  
Initial construction cost of the Airport MAX extension was funded by Tri-Met 
using proceeds from tax-exempt bonds issued to finance the Gateway segment of the 
extension which was supposed to be funded by Bechtel. Bechtel later repaid $28.2 
million as an assignment fee for the development rights at Cascade Station. 
3.2.2 Timeline 
According to a Case study report by PB Consultant in 2009, the timeline of the project is 
stated below. 
September 1997: Bechtel approaches Portland with an unsolicited public-private 
partnership proposal. 
December 1997: The City Council authorized the PDC to undertake a preliminary 
engineering study for the light rail extension with Tri Met and Port of Portland. 
1998: Public entities secure approvals from their respective boards 
1999: Construction started in 1999. 
2001: Airport Max began operation. Tri Met opened the MAX Red Line to serve 





3.2.3 Project Concept 
Innovative approach of the PPP Agreement 
Bechtel Enterprises were provided with development rights to the land adjacent to the 
airport in return for covering some of the construction costs of the light rail extension. 
The question remains how much a private developer will pay for the development rights 
to the area of Cascade Station if this had been a separate transaction not related to the 
construction of the airport extension. At the time of the agreement, Bechtel Enterprises 
believed that it was more advantageous to undertake the Cascade Station development in 
conjunction with the construction of the light rail extension to the airport than to pursue 
the development of the Cascade Station as a separate project. Some studies have argued 
that Bechtel Enterprises pursued the project as a PPP in order to avoid a competitive 
bidding process for the development rights to the area of Cascade Station.  
When private sector funds public infrastructure, a question remains whether the 
overall costs to society of using private funds to develop public infrastructure are reduced 
or increased compared to funding these projects entirely from public sources. While 
private sector funding is often viewed as “free money” by the agencies sponsoring a 
particular project because these funds does not come from constrained budgets but have 
to be repaid in some way or other. This makes it difficult to understand whether this 
particular PPP approach has long-term public interest or is a way for the private company 
to make money. However, with growing public interest these questions become 
increasingly important.  
MAX Airport Extension provides an excellent example of a Design-Build PPP 
project where there is an advantage of private sector funding for airport ground access 
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project, as well as the difficulty of knowing whether this approach is really of public 
interest.  
Many elements of advanced planning made this project possible. Plans for this 
transit line were made public before designing so Bechtel Enterprises were aware of them 
and offered its proposal accordingly. The unsolicited proposal of design-build method of 
project delivery and also providing the development rights of Cascade Station to Bechtel 
saved time in building Airport Max.  
In general if the private company has faith in the public administration, it will 
partner with the public sector. It was unclear in this project whether Bechtel’s innovative 
approach to this DB planning paid-off financially for them or not.  Well whatever may be 
the reasons for Bechtel to approach with an unsolicited proposal, the public got a new rail 
line ten years ahead of schedule. 
In Portland, the local bodies have significant control over development. 
Development rights within Portland are very valuable. Hence, it played an important role 
in making this project successful. However, Bechtel’s financial return on this project is 
unclear, since the financial status of the private entity is not made public. So the question 
remains whether it was a bad decision for the company in the real estate end or did it 
expect losses to be covered through its construction costs. One of the other lessons that is 
learnt is that it is a challenge to maintain transparency in the whole process. It is tough to 
involve the public in negotiations with the private sector. In this project Bechtel had an 
unsolicited bid without any competitive bidding process. Therefore public was involved 
after most of the designs were made. 
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In April 2009 a detailed case study was done by PB Consult on the development 
and financing of the Airport Red Line extension for the AASHTO (American Association 
of State Highway and Transportation Officials) Center for Excellence in Project Finance. 
Many information about this case study are drawn from that study. 
 
3.3 WMATA Largo Metrorail Extension 
The Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MTA) and the Washington Metropolitan 
Area Transit Authority (WMATA) are the lead agencies of the WMATA Largo Metrorail 
Extension project. It is a 3.1-mile heavy rail extension of WMATA Metro’s Blue Line. 
The project aimed at extending the Blue Line from its terminus at the Addison Road-Seat 
Pleasant Station to Largo Town Center, located just beyond the Capital Beltway in Prince 
George’s County, Maryland. The project includes tunnel and surface segments. The 
project also includes two new stations at Morgan Boulevard and Largo Town Center; also 
purchase of 14 heavy rail vehicles. All the stations provide a total of 2,700 park-and-ride 
spaces and bus bays. The project also provides direct walking access to a new Boulevard 
Cap Center retail development. It gives walking access and shuttle bus service to the 
sports complex at FedEx Field.  
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Figure 3.3 WMATA Largo Metrorail Extension Map 
Source: www.ft.dot.gov (accessed on 10/15/13) 
3.3.1 Funding 
The total capital cost of the project is $607.20 million.  
Table 3.2 Funding sources 









According to a study done by Washington DC Metropolitan Area on the Largo Metrorail 





July 1997: Preliminary engineering for the Largo Metrorail Extension was initiated  
April 2000: Completion of preliminary engineering. 
October 1996: A Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was made.  
December 1999: Final EIS was completed.  
February 2000: Federal Transit Administration (FTA) issued a Record of Decision for 
the Largo Metrorail Extension  
July 2000: Approved the project into final design.  
December 2000: WMATA and FTA entered into a Fully Funded Grant Agreement 
(FFGA).  
May 26, 2000: The non-Federal share for the original FFGA project was provided by the 
State of Maryland through a funding agreement with WMATA. 
March 2001: WMATA went for a Design-Build Public Private Partnership  
October 2002: The final contract was initiated for the stations and parking facilities.  
September 2002: An additional $13.60 million was authorized by Prince George’s 
County and the Maryland Department of Transportation to add a parking structure at the 
Largo Station and a day care center at the Morgan Boulevard Station.  
September 2002: The WMATA Board approved $9.00 million.  
December 2004:  Revenue operations started. 
July 2006: FFGA was amended to add $173.30 million for additional rail cars and 





3.3.3 Project Concept 
 
Much information about this project concept has been taken from a study by Washington 
DC Metropolitan Area on the Largo Metrorail Extension in 2007. They stated the final 
cost of the Largo Metrorail Extension project were approximately $1 million less than 
what WMATA had budgeted for them. The design-build contractor used a jet van tunnel 
ventilation system in the project which saved approximately $10 million over the vent 
shafts. The cost got directly saved here. Hence, innovations in project design resulted in 
savings.  The size of the project was such that it was expected to have 15 to 20 
contractors and might have applied Desin-Bid-Build approach. Instead the number of 
contractors reporting to WMATA went down to 3 contractors. Therefore it reduced the 
complexity and cost of managing the project and procuring contractors. WMATA 
originally projected overhead cost savings related to a shortened project timeframe versus 
commodities-related cost savings. Later the overhead cost savings did not impact the 
project much given its completion before the recent sharp increases in key construction 
commodities. The jet van tunnel ventilation system that has been used in the project was 
found to be easier to maintain and more efficient to operate, though special equipment 
was required to maintain them. The design-build contractor suggested the tunnel 
ventilation changes to WMATA for the Largo Metrorail Extension project  which 
improved a project by applying a construction technique that is both higher quality and 






3.4 BART Oakland Airport Connector 
The BART Oakland Airport Connector project has been a public private partnership 
with Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain approach between Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(BART), the Federal Transit Administration, the Alameda County Transportation 
Improvement Authority (ACTIA), the Alameda County Congestion Management Agency 
(ACCMA), the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), California Department 
of Transportation (Caltrans), the California Transportation Commission (CTC), the City 
of Oakland and the Port of Oakland. The concept of an improved transit link between 
Oakland International Airport (OAK) and the BART system has been discussed and 
various feasibility and environmental studies have been undertaken since the early 1970s. 
There are existing transportation constraints in the Bay Area, increased growth at OAK, 
anticipated future public and private development, and related congestion along 
roadways. Thus there was an urgent need for the Oakland Airport Connector (OAC).   
Transit services to OAK include Air BART, Alameda-Contra Costa Transit 
District (AC Transit) buses, taxis and airport shuttles. All these transit services provide 
various levels of service. The traffic congestion, the crowd during Oakland Coliseum 
events raises concerns for air passengers and that resulted in use of transit services to 
access OAK. Since there are no fixed travel times for Air BART between the 
Coliseum/Oakland Airport BART Station and OAK and also the wait times vary for Air 
BART at the station and at the airport purchasing tickets at the Coliseum/Oakland Airport 
BART Station and OAK becomes confusing and inconvenient for passengers which 
results in additional loss of time and frustration for travelers. Hence there was a need for 
a connector. This 3.2-mile connector was proposed as a transit alternative to driving 
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individual automobiles and the overall airport traffic will benefit by reducing the number 




















         Figure 3.4  BART Oakland Airport Connector 






OAK has been the largest aviation project and completed a $350 million Terminal 
Improvement Program. The program started in April 2004. A 20-year Master Plan was 
prepared by The Port of Oakland, owner and operator of OAK in cooperation with 
airport, government and community stakeholders. The plan demarcated land use for 
airport facilities like passenger terminal, cargo, and airport services, airfield and aircraft 
apron, and public access using expanded roadways and ground transportation 
alternatives, such as the OAC. BART staff studied the impact of the project in details. 
The results show that the OAC project will create more than 2,500 jobs.  
According to a paper, “Job Impacts of Spending on Public Transportation,” 
prepared by the Economic Development Research Group for the American Public 
Transportation Association (APTA), every $1 billion in transportation capital investments 
supports 24,000 direct, indirect and induced jobs. Using this formula the OAC project 
figured out more than 7,000 direct, indirect and induced jobs will be created from this 
project.  
3.4.1 Funding  
The total project budget for the OAC project is approximately $484 million. In July 2010 
project funding partners developed a funding plan to address the loss of $70 million in 
previously anticipated federal stimulus funds, and are in the process of being considered 
by the various agency boards. The loss of stimulus funding is primarily offset by $35 
million from new sources, better bid pricing than anticipated and increased debt 
financing. The funding plan is within the borrowing limits established by the BART 








Debt draws  105.7 
 




1970:  Phase I Transit Access Feasibility Study completed. 
1975:  Phase II Oakland Airport Transit Access Project completed. 
1980: Oakland Airport Transit Connector Working Paper Preliminary Design and 
Engineering Phase completed. 
1981: Oakland Airport Transit Connector Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
completed. 
1993:  Project Update Report for the Oakland Airport Intermodal Connector Project 
completed. 
November 7, 2000:  Alameda County provided funding for a series of transportation-
related projects, including the Oakland Airport Connector. 
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March 28, 2002: The BART Board of Directors certified the Final Environmental 
Impact Report (EIR) and approved the BART link to Oakland International Airport via 
elevated Automated Guide way Transit (AGT) system. 
May 2009: BART issued an RFP/RFQ for Design-Build Operate Maintain (DBOM) 
contract. 
December 10, 2009: The BART Board of Directors authorized the Notice of Intent to 
award the Oakland Airport Connector DBOM contract to Flatiron/Parsons with a Joint 
Venture. 
September 16, 2010: The BART Board of Directors reaffirmed the authorization of the 
contract for the project.  
3.4.3 Project Concept 
An Automated Guide way Transit (AGT) system has been used in the OAC project. The 
AGT system operates within their own guide ways. They have stations physically 
integrated with the Coliseum/Oakland Airport BART Station and the airport terminal. 
This system does not require a vehicle operator which in turn reduces the cost. Selection 
of the specific technology has been a part of the design-build procurement process.  
From the Coliseum/Oakland Airport BART Station to Doolittle Drive, the 
alignment will proceed in the median of Hegenberger Road. South of Doolittle Drive on 
Oakland International Airport, it will run between Airport Drive to the west and the Lew 
F. Galbraith Municipal Golf Course to the east. The AGT vehicles operate in an elevated 
guide way, to separate itself from other vehicular traffic. Since the AGT system is a 
driver less system, it is better to separate it from the general vehicular traffic and provide 
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an exclusive right of way. The BART Oakland Airport Connector project had been 
partially funded by the private. A DBFO delivery approach added an estimated $30 to 
$40 million to the cost of the concession over a 30 to 40 year term. If a DBOM delivery 
approach was applied, then the state had to fund the whole project, but in this case the 
state was running short of money. So private financing became necessary. The BART 
Oakland Airport Connector project would not be possible without using a DBFO 
structure because of the poor economic climate; a major amount of state funding for the 
project would not have been available before several years. Only because of the 
advantage of the DBFO approach of getting funds from the private agency, BART is 
using a PPP structure for its Oakland Airport Connector project. Under the proposed 
DBFO structure for the project, the private agent finances half of the project’s capital 
cost. The debt service would be repaid from fare revenue which will be generated by the 
project’s operation. One major reason BART selected a DBFO project delivery approach 
for the Oakland Airport Connector project is because it would build a high-quality 
system. The private agency will develop a high-quality system because it is responsible 
for capital reinvestment. It is also responsible for system turnover costs over the 35-year 
span of the O&M contract.  The project will also benefit from the efficiencies created by 
direct operation and maintenance by the private agency. 
 
3.5 Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & MOS-2 
The Hudson–Bergen Light Rail (HBLR) is a 20.6-mile long light rail service that runs 
as the north-south transit connector within the Hudson County communities of Bayonne, 
Jersey City, Hoboken, Weehawken, Union City, and North Bergen with 23 stops along 3 
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services. In 1996, HBLR project evolved as a public-private partnership project with 
Washington Group International with a Design-Build- Operate - Maintain contract. The 
timeframe was 15 years. Washington Group International was awarded the $1.1 billion 
contract to a team led by URS. The team was known as 21st Century Rail and were 
contracted to design and construct the system, procure the equipment, and operate and 
maintain the line. The project scope was increased later which resulted in increase of the 
cost to $1.9 billion contract including 20 years of operations and maintenance. The 
Hudson-Bergen LRT is the first Design-Build-Operate-Maintain transit project in the 
U.S. and was the first such contract awarded to a single contractor. The Hudson-Bergen  
LRT project brought in developments in the areas across the line. Commercial and 
residential developments are the major land use developments that took place near the 
Hudson River waterfront. Many abandoned industrial neighborhoods turned into thriving 
communities. The whole route was developed in multiple phases. It was a product of 
intensive planning, public participation and political cooperation. Being the first DBOM 

























HBLR linkages are linked to multiple connections. New transportation options 
have been opened up because of such connections. The HBLR provides connections to 
the PATH service into New York City and Newark, suburban commuter rail at Hoboken. 
It also provides ferry service at many points, bus stops at most stations. The current 
HBLR fleet consists of 53 low-floor electric light rail cars.       
Figure 3.5 HBLR Route  
 
Source:http://www.city-data.com/forum/general-u-s/952256-public-





Table 3.4 Funding sources 
First Segment cost:                                                        $990 million 
Federal Transportation Administration  
New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund  
$600 million 
$390 million 
Second Segment:                                                             $1.2 billion 
Federal Transportation Administration. 




Fare box is recovered by NJ TRANSIT. Ridership and Marketing promotions are the 
responsibilities of Agency Operator responsible for all maintenance and personnel costs. 
NJ TRANSIT pays an annual fee to the Operator. 
 
3.5.2 Timeline 
February 1996: Technical Proposals were made. 
June 1996: Priced Proposals were made. 
July 1996: Board authorized the proposals. 
September 1996: Contract Signed. 
November 1996: Notice to Proceed. 
April 15, 2000: The first section opened from 34th Street to Exchange Place. 
November 18, 2000: The light rail is extended north to Newport.  
September 29, 2002: The light rail is extended north to Hoboken Terminal.  
November 15, 2003: The light rail is extended south to 22nd Street.  
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September 7, 2004: The light rail is extended north to Lincoln Harbor.  
October 29, 2005: The light rail is extended north to Port Imperial. 
February 25, 2006: The line is extended to Tonnelle Avenue in North Bergen.  
January 31, 2011: The light rail is extended south to 8th Street in Bayonne. 
3.5.3 Project Concept 
By applying a PPP, many of the risks associated with developing and operating a project 
can be shared with the private sector. Risk sharing can provide incentives to improve the 
quality, cost effectiveness, or timeliness of a project. As one project sponsor observed, 
under a design-bid build approach contractors would sit back and leave it to the sponsor 
to resolve design problems. On the other hand, with design-build, the contractor team 
members must implement what they themselves design, and will come to the plate much 
faster to make sure the design works than under design-bid-build. One of the primary 
reasons the public sector is interested in using PPPs is to achieve time savings in the total 
development process through concurrent performance of certain activities whose results 
are not mutually dependent, efficient use of resources, and related cost savings. PPPs can 
also expedite the application of advanced technology. Thus, private developers seek to 
“fast-track” design and construction, proceeding with certain elements of the construction 
work while design is still ongoing on others, and involving the construction firm in 
design reviews to avoid delays associated with design defects affecting project 
construction. Time savings can also lower the cost of the project by avoiding large 
increases in material costs due to price inflation. The Hudson Bergen Light Rail project 
advanced by at least one and possibly two years by using a DBOM delivery approach 
versus design-bid-build. NJ Transit discovered that when the concessionaire did more 
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design itself instead of subcontracting design, the agency obtained superior results 
because there was better coordination between the prime contractor and the operator. The 
design of the Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 was by a sub-contractor, which created 
coordination and communication issues between the project’s designer and operator. The 
lead for the DB consortium designed Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-2 directly, and was 
more responsive to civil and system’s needs, which achieved a better product easily. 
Lower indirect costs include avoided costs attributable to the selection of a PPP. 
Indirect cost savings also result from the transfer of risk of operating and maintenance 
cost increases to a consortium. NJ Transit will pay the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail 
project’s DBOM consortium a guaranteed price in 1996 dollars for the operation and 
maintenance of the line, subject to increases in the consumer price index (CPI) and other 
inflation indices for selected operating costs, including electricity. This insulates the 
agency from growth in operating costs for reasons other than inflation, and provides the 
operating consortium incentive to keep a lid on O&M cost escalation.  For Hudson 
Bergen Light Rail project, the sponsoring agency was able to increase both ridership and 
revenues by bringing the projects online for revenue service earlier than using a more 
traditional project delivery approach. This benefits both the sponsoring transit agencies 
and their patrons. The major social welfare benefit of PPPs is their ability to expedite the 
delivery of transit facilities and services and to reduce capital and operating costs so that 
these benefits can be generated in a timelier manner at the same or lower overall costs. 
 NJ Transit discovered that its DBOM contract for the Hudson-Bergen LRT 
project did not adequately address the quality of service to the traveling public. While the 
consortium received a penalty or bonus for on-time performance, there were no 
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incentives for station cleanliness or notification of customers of changes in service or 
other announcements, which became an issue. This experience highlights the need for 
detailed performance standards and proper incentives for performance.  
The project has improved mobility and connectivity in northern New Jersey and 






The analysis has been done based on the PPP impacts of various factors like project cost, 
project timeframe, direct and indirect costs, capacity building, project quality, funding 
sources and revenue of the selected transit project case studies reviewed in this study so 
far. 
As shown in Table 4.1 , Denver T-REX Southeast Corridor LRT, Portland 
MAX Airport Extension and WMATA Largo Metrorail Extension projects followed 
a Design-Build approach of project delivery ranging from total project cost of $128.8 
million to $1.67 billion and all the projects have been successful. This indicates that the 
DB approach can be applied to projects of various sizes. All these three projects were 
completed within or under budget as compared to BART Oakland Airport Connector 
and Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & MOS-2 which followed a DBFO and DBOM 
approach respectively. Both these projects went above the estimated project cost due to 
private financing. Hence according to these case studies, Design-Build approach tries to 
complete the project within budget. 
All the three approaches of public private partnership studied through these case 
studies show that they all have been completed before the estimated timeframe because 
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$28M, 23% of 
project cost.  
 
Also funded by 
the City of 
Portland, Tri-










































For Denver T-REX Southeast Corridor LRT, Portland MAX Airport 
Extension projects, the estimated building material costs got saved. For WMATA Largo 
Metrorail Extension project, reduction of estimated contractors from 15-20 to 3 
contractors simplified WMATA’s Largo Metrorail Extension project management and 
reduced the cost and complexity of managing the project and procuring contractors. Also, 
the jet van tunnel ventilation system that has been used in the project was found to be 
easier to maintain and more efficient to operate. Thus there were substantial cost savings. 
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In Design Build projects, it is seen that because the projects were completed before time, 
the cost of managing the project and contractors got reduced. Hence the overall cost got 
reduced. For BART Oakland Airport Connector and Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & 
MOS-2 projects, transfer of operating and maintenance to the private sector saved the 
overall cost. Therefore, for DBOM projects, since the responsibility of many of the risks 
and cost associated with developing and operating a project is with the private sector, the 
risks get shared. This in turn makes the project cost effective. 
The Denver T-REX Southeast Corridor LRT project felt the need for more 
participation by the development community and adjacent property owners. The problem 
was the local jurisdictions did not encourage early collaboration. If the local jurisdictions 
had prepared and used land-use plans for the station areas, those would have been useful. 
Absence of these plans and the lack of initiation of a public planning process by the local 
jurisdiction, the project team made the error of developing Transit Oriented Development 
(TOD) concepts without coordinating well with all the local landowners. Also there were 
limited staffs with TOD knowledge. The Portland MAX Airport Extension project had 
a unique unsolicited proposal of design-build method of project delivery and also 
providing the development rights of Cascade Station to Bechtel. This project also had 
lack of public participation during the design phase. It can be inferred that in a public 
private partnership approach, when the responsibility of designing and building is with 
the private sector, the local jurisdictions have to take the initiative to collaborate the 
public with the private sector before the start of the design phase. 
For WMATA Largo Metrorail Extension project innovative design leads to 
higher quality project. This is the only Design – Build project that has a good project 
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quality because of its innovative design. For the DBFO and DBOM projects, operation 
and maintenance portion provide incentives for quality production. 
The Portland MAX Airport Extension project followed a Design-Build 
approach but had an innovative approach. It had an up-front private funding for 23% of 
the project capital cost which made the project happen. The BART Oakland Airport 
Connector project had an up-front private funding for 50% of the project capital cost 
because it followed a DBFO approach. The project went into a public private partnership 
only because it was receiving 50% private funding because the state was not able to 
collect that amount and would have to wait for a long time. Hence, it implies that due to 
the lack of state funds, funds have been taken from the private sector which resulted in 
reducing the timeframe. Though it is still unclear whether the private sector benefits from 
the project or not. 
In the Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & MOS-2 projects, the sponsoring agency 
were able to increase revenues by bringing the project online for revenue service. 
Revenue information for most of the projects mainly the ones funded partially by the 














EVALUATION OF THE PPP APPROACHES 
 
After comparing all the 3 types of Public Private Partnership approaches that has been 
widely practiced throughout the country, it is seen that Design-Build-Operate-Maintain, 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate and Design-Build is the most successful approaches. 
Based on project size and cost, schedule, risk management and allocation, capacity 
building, lifecycle issues and construction claims all the three project delivery 
approaches have been evaluated. 
 
5.1 Project Size and Cost 
Project size reflects the dollar value and physical dimensions of the transit corridor. This 
issue represents several aspects of project cost like ability to handle budget restrictions, 
early and precise cost estimation, and consistent control of project costs. 
 The design build approach has been shown to work on projects of all sizes 
varying from Portland MAX Airport Extension project with $128.8 million to Denver 
T-REX Southeast Corridor LRT project with $1.67 billion. It has been noted that DB 
can facilitate better management of small projects due to the single source of 
responsibility like for Portland MAX Airport Extension project. As projects grow in 
size, there can be large peaks in owner staffing requirements with DB. Also the number 
of contractors increases which increases the cost and complexity of managing the project 
and procuring contractors.  
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 Design Build Finance Operate approach can work well on small to medium sized 
projects because the project is partially funded by the private sector. According to the 
BART Oakland Airport Connector project, it is not clear whether they earned enough 
revenue or not. So, bigger the project, larger would be the amount share of the private 
company.  
 DBOM is appropriate for large projects. Similar to DB, can facilitate better 
management of large projects due to the single source of responsibility. DBOM is not 
appropriate for smaller projects due to the overhead costs (e.g., for maintenance, etc.) as 
seen in the Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & MOS-2 projects. There is a disadvantage of 
DBOM approach. The private sector is provided with a fixed cost for design, 
construction, and maintenance very early in the process. Due to the large amount of risk 
being taken by the DBOM provider, costs may be higher if the providers are not given 
opportunities to find efficiencies. DBOM pricing may be harder to negotiate due to the 
complexity and time frame of maintenance contracts. 
 
5.2 Schedule 
This factor shows two aspects of project schedule and includes both the ability to 
shorten the schedule and the opportunity to control and prevent time growth. 
The design build approach provides a single point of responsibility (DB contractor) for 
schedule control. If the project is bigger, the number of contractors might increase as in 
the case of Portland MAX Airport Extension project. Each contractor is responsible 
for schedule control. It gives early schedule certainty.  
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 Design Build Finance Operate approach also has a single point of responsibility. 
DBFO has also been good for small to medium sized projects and hence will have less 
number of contractors who are responsible for schedule control. 
 DBOM approach also provides a single point of responsibility (DB contractor) for 
schedule control. And also gives early scheduled certainty. One of the DBOM projects, 
Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & MOS-2 projects provides the least schedule growth. It 
facilitates the start-up process due to a single point of responsibility for design, 
construction, and operation. Rapid schedule will require owner effort in design and 
construction reviews.  
 
5.3 Risk Management and Allocation 
The issue details methods to cope with project uncertainties that are inherent to each 
delivery method. Each project delivery method has inherent risk-allocation 
characteristics. The overarching goal should be to select the project delivery method 
with the best ability to assign project risks to the parties in the best position to manage 
them. 
 For Design Build approach, the private sector has the single point of 
responsibility for risk management in design and construction.  The design - builder 
owns risk for design errors and omissions. The owner may lose some ability to 
participate in the risk management process. Risks are allocated through conceptual 
design and performance specifications. Like for the Denver T-REX Southeast 
Corridor project, there was a lack of the public planning process, hence they made an 
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error of developing TOD with staffs having limited knowledge of TOD which resulted 
in errors in the RFP.  
 Design Build Finance Operate approach has a single point of responsibility for 
risk management in design, construction and operate. The design - builder owns risk for 
design and construction errors and omissions. The owner may lose some ability to 
participate in the risk management process for design, construction and operation. Risks 
are allocated through conceptual design and performance specifications for design, 
construction and operation. 
 In DBOM approach, the private sector has a single point of responsibility for risk 
allocation in design, construction, operation, and maintenance. Constructor owns risk for 
design errors and omissions in construction, operations and maintenance. The owner 
may lose some ability to participate in the risk management process for design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance. Risks must be allocated through conceptual 
design and performance specifications for design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance. 
 
5.4 Capacity Building 
Each project delivery method has some inherent abilities to include these features in 
accordance with the owner’s needs. The level of experience of an owner’s staff can affect 
the success of an alternative delivery method application. The total number of required 
owner’s employees for each delivery method is one measure of the extent of owner 
involvement. Another important measure for the owners is the variation in the number of 
staff required throughout the project development process. This issue regards the owner’s 
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requirement to furnish a highly capable staff to complete the duties it must undertake in 
each delivery method. Agency goals define project success. The extent to which these 
goals align with the inherent attributes of each project delivery method has a significant 
bearing on the delivery method selected. The owner’s ability to control the details of 
design and construction varies with each project delivery method. Each delivery method 
can facilitate agreements with third parties, such as political entities, utilities, railroads, 
etc. in a different manner. The extent to which designers or constructors can facilitate 
third-party agreements is the basis for the advantages and disadvantages of each delivery 
method. 
In the Design Build approach, an owner can use some Leadership in Energy & 
Environmental Design (LEED) certification elements to select constructor. Single point 
of responsibility is provided for LEED certification in design and construction. Agencies 
can take advantage of the sole point of responsibility for design and construction to 
leverage their experience. DB can greatly reduce the number of required owner staff. The 
design and construction reviews can be done in shorter periods of time. The owners are 
able to rely on one source of responsibility for both design and construction as it has been 
done for Denver T-REX Southeast Corridor LRT and Portland MAX Airport 
Extension projects. The best-value design-builder selection aligns the team with the 
project goals.  
The owner may not be involved in all LEED decisions. The agencies may not 
have experience authoring DB RFPs as it happened to Denver T-REX Southeast 
Corridor LRT project. Lack of knowledge in conducting procurements and also 
administering DB contracts, particularly in the area of design review and administration 
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and also lack of TOD concepts created problems. DB necessitates experienced staff to 
manage design and construction under one contract. Fewer owner staff is needed but 
experienced staff is required. DB is an alternative delivery method and it is advisable to 
have a staff with DB oversight experience. Owners need capabilities to develop 
procurement documents and performance criteria. The owners also need to have the 
capabilities of reviewing design under a DB contract. To ensure success, agencies must 
completely understand goals prior to awarding the DB contract.  
In Design Build Finance Operate approach, the owner can use some LEED 
certification elements to select constructor. In addition to having a single point of 
responsibility provided for LEED certification in design and construction, many LEED 
principles are in alignment with the constructor’s motivation to minimize operating costs. 
Similar to DB, agencies can take advantage of the sole point of contact for design, 
construction, and operation to leverage their experience. Similar to DB, DBFO can 
greatly reduce the number of required owner staff. Design and construction reviews can 
be done in shorter periods of time. The owners are able to rely on one source of 
responsibility for design, construction and operations. In addition to the DB advantages, 
DBFO allows owners to include operational goals in the contract. But on the other hand, 
the owner may not be involved in all LEED decisions. Agencies may not have experience 
authoring DBFO RFPs and conducting procurements though nothing as such has been 
seen in the BART Oakland Airport Connector projects. Agencies may not have 
experience administering DBFO contracts, particularly in the area of design review and 
administration. DBFO necessitates the most experienced staff to manage design, 
construction, and operation under one contract. DBFO can create large peaks in owner 
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staffing needs during procurement and design review due to the inclusion of operational 
and financial issues involved in the process. While fewer owner staff is needed, more 
experienced staff is required.  Similar to DB, DBFO is an alternative delivery method and 
it is advisable to have staff members with DBFO oversight experience. The owners will 
need capabilities to develop procurement documents and performance criteria. The 
owners will also need capabilities to analyze complex financial proposals. Similar to DB, 
agencies must completely understand goals prior to awarding the DBFO contract.  
In DBOM approach, the owner can use some LEED certification elements to 
select constructor. In addition to having a single point of responsibility provided for 
LEED certification in design and construction, many LEED principles are in alignment 
with the constructor’s motivation to minimize operating costs. Similar to DB, agencies 
can take advantage of the sole point of contact for design, construction, and maintenance 
to leverage their experience. Similar to DB, DBOM can greatly reduce the number of 
required owner staff. Design and construction reviews can be done in shorter periods of 
time. The owners are able to rely on one source of responsibility for design, construction, 
operations, and maintenance. In addition to the DB advantages, DBOM allows owners to 
include lifecycle and maintenance goals in the contract. But on the other hand, the owner 
may not be involved in all LEED decisions. Agencies may not have experience authoring 
DBOM RFPs and conducting procurements though nothing as such has been seen in the 
Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & MOS-2 projects. Agencies may not have experience 
administering DBOM contracts, particularly in the area of design review and 
administration. DBOM necessitates the most experienced staff to manage design, 
construction, and maintenance under one contract. DBOM can create large peaks in 
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owner staffing needs during procurement and design review due to the inclusion of 
maintenance and financial issues involved in the process. While fewer owner staff is 
needed, more experienced staff is required.  Similar to DB, DBOM is an alternative 
delivery method and it is advisable to have staff members with DBOM oversight 
experience. The owners will need capabilities to develop procurement documents and 
performance criteria. The owners will also need capabilities to analyze complex financial 
proposals. Similar to DB, agencies must completely understand goals prior to awarding 
the DBOM contract.  
5.5 Lifecycle Issues 
Delivery methods can influence costs in the operation and maintenance phase. This issue 
focuses on the opportunities or barriers that each delivery method provides with regard to 
life cycle costs. There can be advantages and disadvantages to each delivery method with 
regard to how maintainability is achieved. This issue describes these advantages and 
disadvantages as they relate to the owner’s ability to specify the quality and ease of 
maintenance. Sustainable design is becoming ever more important in achieving overall 
sustainability goals for projects. The effect of delivery method in facilitating the process 
of implementing sustainability issues in the design is the focus of this issue. 
In the Design Build approach, the agency can use performance criteria to set 
lifecycle performance standards and rely on design-builder innovation to achieve these 
standards. For WMATA Largo Metrorail Extension project innovative design lead to 
higher quality project and lifecycle cost savings. The agency can emphasize sustainable 
design and construction issues through performance criteria and best value award factors. 
Integration of the design and construction team can enhance constructability of designs. 
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If lifecycle performance criteria are not well understood at the procurement stage, they 
will not be incorporated into the DB contract. If sustainable design issues are not well 
understood at the procurement stage, they will not be incorporated into the DB contract.  
If sustainable construction issues are not well understood at the procurement stage, they 
will not be incorporated into the DB contract. 
In DBFO approach, the design-builder is responsible for operations in the DBFO 
contract and will be highly motivated to provide optimal lifecycle designs. The agency 
can use performance criteria to set lifecycle performance standards and rely on design-
builder innovation to achieve these standards. The design-builder is responsible for 
operations in the DBFO contract and will be highly motivated to provide optimal 
lifecycle designs. The agency can emphasize operations issues through performance 
criteria and best value award factors. The agency can emphasize sustainable design issues 
through performance criteria and best value award factors. Integration of the design and 
construction team can enhance constructability of designs. The agency does not have 
complete control over all life cycle issues that are not included as performance criteria in 
the contract. If sustainable construction issues are not well understood at the procurement 
stage, they will not be incorporated into the DBFO contract. 
In DBOM approach, the design-builder is responsible for maintenance in the 
DBOM contract and will be highly motivated to provide optimal lifecycle designs. The 
agency can use performance criteria to set lifecycle performance standards and rely on 
design-builder innovation to achieve these standards. The design-builder is responsible 
for maintenance in the DBOM contract and will be highly motivated to provide optimal 
lifecycle designs. The agency can emphasize maintainability issues through performance 
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criteria and best value award factors. The agency can emphasize sustainable design 
issues through performance criteria and best value award factors. Integration of the 
design and construction team can enhance constructability of designs. The agency does 
not have complete control over all life cycle issues that are not included as performance 
criteria in the contract. If sustainable construction issues are not well understood at the 
procurement stage, they will not be incorporated into the DBOM contract. 
 
5.6 Construction Claims 
The effect of each delivery method in exposing the agency to potential conflicts and 
claims is addressed under this issue. The extent to which a delivery method can prevent 
adversarial relationships on the project team varies depending upon the nature of the 
project and the owner’s experience with the delivery methods. 
In the Design- Build approach, the single source for design and construction 
eliminates claims for design errors or omissions from the agency’s perspective. 
Inclusion of the designer and constructor on the same team can lessen adversarial 
relationships which have been seen in the Denver T-REX Southeast Corridor LRT 
and Portland MAX Airport Extension projects. There is potential for claims with 
regard to scope definition if the form of the DB contract is not well understood. Due to 
the loss of control over the details of design, DB requires a high level of trust between 
the owner and design-builder. Without this trust, design-build can become adversarial. 
DBFO has similar advantages to DB and additionally eliminates claims regarding 
operating performance due to the integration of the operator. Inclusion of the designer, 
constructor, and operator contractor on the same team can lessen adversarial 
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relationships which have been seen in BART Oakland Airport Connector project. 
There is potential for claims with regard to scope definition if the form of the DBFO 
contract is not well understood. Similar to DB, DBFO delivery requires a high level of 
trust to succeed. 
DBOM has similar advantages to DB and additionally eliminates claims regarding 
operating performance due to the integration of the operator. Inclusion of the designer, 
constructor, and maintenance contractor on the same team can lessen adversarial 
relationships which have been seen for Hudson-Bergen LRT MOS-1 & MOS-2 
projects. There is potential for claims with regard to scope definition if the form of the 
DBOM contract is not well understood. Similar to DB, DBOM delivery requires a high 






6.1 Lessons Learnt 
DBOM approach allows the private company to focus the project team towards the 
lifecycle of the project considering designing, building, operating and maintaining the 
whole project. DBOM approach tends to deliver a better quality project because the 
project team in order to increase their revenue and profitability decreases Operation & 
Maintenance costs. The transit project can be designed and constructed with operating 
performance rather than initial cost in mind. Increased integration of the project team 
can foster collaboration among architects, engineers, constructors and operators, 
facilitating a high performing project team. Also public participation with the project 
team should be initiated and encouraged by the local jurisdiction for better design and 
on-time performance. Systems can be right sized when they are designed with reliable 
O&M procedures in mind. This approach eliminates claims regarding operating 
performance due to the integration of the operator. The private company is responsible 
for maintenance in the DBOM contract and will be highly motivated to provide optimal 
lifecycle designs. DBOM allows owners to include lifecycle and maintenance goals in 
the contract. The transfer of design liability lessens the need for agency control over 
design and maintenance decisions.  
The DBFO approach is generally taken up if the state does not have enough funds 
to fund the project. Well, it is unclear whether the private agency is financially 
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successful or not because the financial information of the private agencies are not made 
public.  
The DBOM delivery method provides a single source for design, construction, 
operation and maintenance that proves to be the tool for facilitating high performance 
project teams to deliver high performance. Though DBOM approach seems to be the 
better PPP approach but it is not meant for smaller projects due to the overhead cost.  
By all other means Design –Build approach is taken up mostly for public private 
partnership of transit projects because they are applicable for projects of various sizes. 
Also, private sector funding is not required in this approach, so the private agency does 
not have to worry about revenue generation and can concentrate only on design and 
construction issues. 
 
6.2 Further Studies 
Considering all the three project delivery approaches, it can be seen that Design – Build- 
Finance- Operate can provide a very high quality project but not many projects have 
taken up this approach. Also, financial status of the private agency is a very important 
entity in this approach.  This has been unclear even after studying the project that 
followed DBFO approach. Further studies can be done to understand whether DBFO 
brings financial profitability of the private agency or not. If it does, then how can the 
DBFO approach of project delivery can be made popular among the local and state 
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